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In less than two weeks, President Joe Biden will greet Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and Philippines President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. in Washington for the first trilateral summit of the three leaders. According to the White House, the summit seeks to boost economic cooperation, advance alternative supply chains and " further peace and security in the Indo-Pacific and around the world."
But make no mistake about it. This summit is really about one thing and one thing only: China.
The Asian superpower has been flexing its muscles in the South China Sea, which Beijing claims almost in its entirety. Chinese and Philippine vessels have engaged in numerous unarmed clashes in the key waterway, with the People's Liberation Army, or PLA, coast guard obstructing Philippine ships from resupplying sailors based on the Second Thomas Shoal, less than 200 nautical miles west of the Philippines' main island of Palawan.
On March 23, Chinese ships used water cannons on a Philippine ship traversing the waterway, injuring three crew members. This was the fourth time since November Beijing employed water cannons, and it was serious enough from Washington's perspective for the State Department to declare that any armed attack against Philippine ships anywhere in the South China Sea could compel the U.S. to invoke the Mutual Defense Treaty on behalf of Manila. Chinese officials, meanwhile, predictably blame the Philippines for sailing into its territorial waters — an assertion everybody but China rejects.
For Marcos, China's repeated provocations are a reaffirmation that shifting toward the U.S. was the right call. His predecessor, the pugnacious and curse-happy Rodrigo Duterte, was far more interested in getting closer to Beijing, betting that a better relationship with the Asian powerhouse would boost the Philippines' economy. Duterte's flirtations didn't pay off. Marcos came into office in 2022 and tore up the playbook, placing his chips into bettering Manila's 73-year-old alliance with Washington.
Since then, the U.S.-Philippines alliance has gotten deeper and more interconnected, driven by a mutual antagonism toward China's assertiveness. In February 2023, Marcos signed a defense deal with Washington that gave the U.S. access to four more bases in the Philippines, one of which is in Luzon, which sits directly south of Taiwan and could presumably be used in the event of a conflict on the island. U.S. and Philippine naval exercises are now common.
Manila is also taking its own initiative. A few months ago, Marcos' administration pledged to spend an additional $35 billion over the next decade on weapons systems and naval platforms designed to defend its maritime claims in the South China Sea.
The Philippines is hardly the only country in East Asia boosting its defense spending. Japan, for instance, will increase its defense budget by 16% this year, bringing it to $56 billion — the highest ever. Japan's Kishida has followed in the footsteps of the late prime minister, Shinzo Abe, and in some respects exceeded Abe's ambitions.
Japan is developing what Japanese military officials refer to as counterstrike capabilities, or medium-range missiles that could place Chinese and North Korean military targets at risk. The Japanese military is strengthening its presence on the southern island of Yonaguni, which is a little more than 100 miles away from Taiwan.
Tokyo has also become far sterner in its language on the Taiwan issue; true or not, Japanese officials are increasingly concerned that a successful Chinese invasion of Taiwan could presumably pave the way for Chinese aggression against Japan's smaller islands to the south or even the Senkakus, a chain of uninhabited islets claimed by both Beijing and Tokyo.
Japan and the Philippines are improving bilateral relations as well. China is the glue that holds the budding ties together. In December, Japan delivered a radar system to Manila, with two more expected. Japanese and Philippine officials are in the middle of negotiating a reciprocal access agreement, which would allow forces of both nations to enter each other's territories for joint military exercises and relationship-building. This isn't the first access agreement for Japan, which finalized similar deals with India in September 2020, the United Kingdom in January 2023 and Australia in August 2023.
The U.S. is no doubt a key influencer of these events. The Biden administration has stated in a robotic-like fashion that China is its biggest competitor. The Pentagon has referred to China as its "pacing threat," a phrase that suggests that it's Washington trying to keep up with Beijing rather than the other way around.
All of the latest developments will bring a smile to the faces of U.S. officials.
But we shouldn't overstate U.S. influence either. In a way, today's middle powers in Asia are doing what middle powers have done for centuries: taking stock of the security dynamics in their own region and doing what they can to ensure the balance of power continues to be favorable. Or, at the very least, stable. Most of the time, this translates into building relations with regional states holding similar threat perceptions, pouring more resources into the defense budget and ensuring military capabilities are in place if the absolute worst happens.
Some foreign policy commentators and China hawks are deathly worried about Chinese hegemony in Asia, particularly if the PLA took Taiwan by force. But the actions of Japan, the Philippines and other countries such as Australia, India and even Vietnam suggest that Chinese hegemony — assuming Beijing even has the capacity to attain it in a region with such challenging geography — won't be the cakewalk so many make it out to be.
Nations typically don't roll over when they're facing an aspiring hegemon. They defend what's theirs.
The more belligerent China becomes, the more resistance it will likely confront.
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• 12/07/23: Is it REALLY all Iran's fault?
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• 10/26/23 Biden's geopolitical equivalent of a high-wire act --- and success is by no means assured
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• 08/03/23 What should the US do to normalize ties between Israel and Saudi Arabia?
• 06/09/23 Do we face nuclear confrontation? The erosion of agreements has heightened the risk
• 06/01/23 Why is the Defense Department immune from budget cuts?
• 05/18/23 Policy is at a crossroads in a deeply troubled Afghanistan
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• 05/05/23 The US and world were naive about Sudan leaders' commitment to democracy
• 03/20/23 China gets the credit for improving Iran-Saudi Arabia ties --- but the US benefits
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• 02/07/23 How does the US-China relationship continue after the spy balloon saga?
• 12/29/22 Why does the US defense budget continue to grow? America's approach needs rethinking
• 12/22/22 Ever so slowly, the nations are realigning
• 12/22/22 China is pushing a pacifist Japan into building up its military capabilities
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• 10/13/22 Don't underestimate the durability of autocracies
• 09/22/22 Is there still hope for a new Iran nuclear deal?
(COMMENT, BELOW)
Daniel DePetris
Chicago Tribune/(TNS)
Daniel R. DePetris is a fellow at Defense Priorities, a foreign policy think tank based in Washington, D.C., and a syndicated foreign affairs columnist for the Chicago Tribune.