How will the Israel-Hamas conflict affect US policy?

SIGN UP FOR THE DAILY JWR UPDATE. IT'S FREE. Just click here.

It was the worst attack on the state of Israel in 50 years. About 1,000 terrorists affiliated with Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad sneaked into Israel from Gaza by air, land and sea, surprising the Israel Defense Forces, or IDF, and catching the normally capable Israeli intelligence services by complete surprise. The attack was as devastating as it was lethal. At the time of writing, Israeli security forces were still trying to flush out terrorist fighters holed up in small Israeli towns close to the Gaza border.

"This is our 9/11," a spokesperson for the IDF said. "They got us."

More than 700 Israelis were killed in a single day. Nine Americans lost their lives as well, according to the State Department. Dozens of people have been kidnapped by Palestinian militants and sent back to Gaza, presumably to be used as bargaining chips in prison release negotiations. The Hamas rocket fire continues, forcing hundreds of thousands of Israelis in the immediate area to run to bomb shelters.

Amid the chaos, numerous questions are swirling. Most of them don't have clear answers at the moment.

The most immediate question on the list: How exactly will Israel respond?

In a way, the Israelis are already responding, pummeling Hamas positions in the Gaza Strip for the last two days. Israel struck 2,400 Hamas targets, from command-and-control facilities to rocket manufacturing sites, on Monday alone. The death toll in the densely packed enclave is substantial, with more than 550 people killed in the airstrikes thus far. How many are [terrorists] as opposed to civilians, it's impossible to say.

Airstrikes have been Israel's de facto response to attacks emanating from the Gaza Strip over the last decade. Ever since the 2014 war against Hamas, successive Israeli governments have been highly dubious about ground operations in the area, if only because they would entail a high cost. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's strategy on Gaza has relied on a mixture of carrots and sticks: periodic strikes on Hamas installations when necessary and, on occasion, the relaxation of economic restrictions to induce better behavior from the de facto Hamas government there. The goal wasn't to topple Hamas but to maintain a stable equilibrium and a degree of quiet for Israel's southern border communities.

Of course, last weekend's attacks were of such gravity that this well-worn playbook is no longer of use. The IDF has called up 300,000 reservists and sent them to the southern front. Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant ordered a "complete siege" of the enclave, with electricity, food and fuel all prevented from entering. It's increasingly difficult to believe that so many Israeli troops would be called up and deployed close to the Gaza border only to have them sit there and perform guard duty. A large-scale ground invasion of Gaza seems more and more a question of "when," not "if." In which case, the international community should prepare itself for the situation to get even worse before it gets better.

Regarding the U.S., to what extent will the Israeli-Palestinian violence undermine the Biden administration's other priorities in the Middle East?

The White House has big dreams in this region. Senior administration officials, including Secretary of State Antony Blinken and National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan, have spent considerable time and diplomatic capital trying to cement a normalization deal between Israel and Saudi Arabia. Blinken has described a hypothetical Israeli-Saudi pact as one with transformative potential. Sullivan and Brett McGurk, President Joe Biden's top Middle East adviser, have traveled to Saudi Arabia multiple times and no doubt have had even more conversations with their Saudi colleagues over the phone on the technicalities and modalities of such a deal. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman was fully invested in moving relations with Israel out into the open, even if he was also asking for an exorbitantly high price from the United States in the process (including a U.S. defense guarantee and support for a Saudi-based nuclear program with enrichment capability).

The Hamas assault in Israel, though, may have unraveled the normalization track U.S. officials were so desperate to consummate. The Israelis were disappointed with the statement issued by the Saudi Foreign Ministry immediately after the attack, which all but blamed the Israelis for creating an explosive situation. Given the impending Israeli ground incursion into Gaza, Prince Mohammed will now be extremely cautious before proceeding with the normalization process. For the Saudis to continue with business as usual at a time when it's highly likely the Israeli military will be battling Palestinian [terrorists] in the streets of Gaza — and with all the civilian casualties such battles will entail — is just not practical from Riyadh's standpoint. Israel-Saudi normalization may not be dead in the water yet, but it will probably be frozen until the impending war in Gaza is over — whenever that might be.

Finally, we shouldn't forget about the Biden administration's Iran policy either. The White House continues to have a line of communication open with the Iranians, at least indirectly. Last month, Washington and Tehran finalized a prisoner exchange after more than a year of negotiations, and if reports are accurate, the two have entered into an informal arrangement that aims to deescalate the situation between them.

Yet if Iran was involved in the attack on Israel in some way, as unnamed Hamas and Hezbollah sources indicated to The Wall Street Journal, the White House might have to make a determination as to whether its current policy is sustainable. And, if not, what adaptations it needs to make to better meet U.S. interests.

Policymaking is never an easy job. For those responsible for the Middle East, the job just got even harder.

Previously:
• 10/05/23 As the war in Ukraine grinds on, Europe will prove more crucial
• 09/18/23 The US and Vietnam should boost their relationship. China looms large
• 08/24/23 Zelensky's shiny, new toys and yet --- racking-up losses
• 08/17/23 The US is negotiating with Iran to release prisoners. Here's why that matters
• 08/03/23 What should the US do to normalize ties between Israel and Saudi Arabia?
• 06/09/23 Do we face nuclear confrontation? The erosion of agreements has heightened the risk
• 06/01/23 Why is the Defense Department immune from budget cuts?
• 05/18/23 Policy is at a crossroads in a deeply troubled Afghanistan
• 05/12/23 The US war on terror continues. We just don't talk about it
• 05/05/23 The US and world were naive about Sudan leaders' commitment to democracy
• 03/20/23 China gets the credit for improving Iran-Saudi Arabia ties --- but the US benefits
• 02/23/23 The first year of war in Ukraine has defied predictions
• 02/07/23 How does the US-China relationship continue after the spy balloon saga?
• 12/29/22 Why does the US defense budget continue to grow? America's approach needs rethinking
• 12/22/22 Ever so slowly, the nations are realigning
• 12/22/22 China is pushing a pacifist Japan into building up its military capabilities
• 12/09/22 Mideast country is putting US in a tough spot by threatening another Syria incursion
• 10/13/22 Don't underestimate the durability of autocracies
• 09/22/22 Is there still hope for a new Iran nuclear deal?

(COMMENT, BELOW)

Daniel DePetris
Chicago Tribune/(TNS)

Daniel R. DePetris is a fellow at Defense Priorities, a foreign policy think tank based in Washington, D.C., and a syndicated foreign affairs columnist for the Chicago Tribune.