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Whether you think Donald Trump or Joe Biden deserves the credit for pushing Israel and Hamas into a ceasefire deal is largely a sideshow to the main event. As the Tribune Editorial Board astutely observed last week, the most important thing is the substance — 15 months after the war in Gaza started, the parties were finally able to come to terms. On Friday, the Israeli security cabinet voted to advance the deal. The larger cabinet is expected to do the same.
To the more than 2 million Palestinians in Gaza who have lost their loved ones, homes and livelihoods, the announcement of a ceasefire was the best news they could have received. The same can be said for the families of the hostages in Israel, some of whom will be reunited in a matter of days or weeks.
But this is only half the story. The other half still needs to be written, and it could go one of two ways — peace and rebuilding or a return to conflict. At the risk of throwing cold water on the proceedings, it must be said that while Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Hamas agreed to stop the war for six weeks, they still haven't agreed to stop the war permanently. The relief and celebrations we're witnessing in Gaza and Israel today could very well descend into more grief.
By now, we know what's in the agreement. It's structured in three stages. The first involves six weeks of quiet, a return of some hostages in exchange for Palestinian security prisoners, an Israeli military pullout from the Netzarim Corridor dividing Gaza, a gradual reduction of Israeli troops from the Philadelphi Corridor along the Egypt-Gaza border and a surge of humanitarian aid into the enclave.
On the 16th day of Phase 1, Israeli and Hamas negotiators will return to the table to hammer out the contours of Phase 2, which includes a permanent end to the war, more prisoner and hostage releases, and a full Israeli troop withdrawal from the territory. If we get to Phase 3, Gaza will be subject to a massive reconstruction effort.
But the key word here is "if." It's not a given that Phase 1 will lead to Phase 2. The elephant in the room that has killed negotiations time and time again ever since Biden released his peace framework in May is still there: Israel and Hamas are diametrically opposed on whether the pause in hostilities should transition into a lasting end to the war. Nothing in the days since have those positions changed.
Hamas still wants a total and complete end to the conflict and won't release the last several dozen hostages until it gets that. As far as we can tell, Netanyahu still wants to resume the military campaign when Phase 1 is over. He is getting extreme political pressure from right-wing ideologues in his cabinet to do precisely that, one of whom has tied his ongoing support for Netanyahu's government to a continuation of the war. Making it all the more difficult, deciding to end the war in Gaza for good isn't a question of finding the right formula; you either end it or you don't. Either Israel caves or Hamas does. There is no middle ground.
We don't talk about Phase 3 much, but there are a bunch of unanswered questions there as well. The deal is clear on the fundamentals: Gaza will be flooded with an internationally backed reconstruction campaign. To say this is sorely needed is a tremendous understatement. According to the United Nations, nearly 70% of Gaza's buildings have been damaged or destroyed. Reconstruction costs are estimated at $18.5 billion. Simply clearing the 50 million tons of rubble might take up to 15 years.
The details about who will administer and finance this reconstruction plan, not to mention how Gaza will actually be governed after the war is over, is still a subject of intense negotiations by the major stakeholders. If the United States had its way, the West Bank-based Palestinian Authority (PA) would invite international partners into Gaza to help run an interim administration, staffed by Palestinians from Gaza as well as PA officials. Over time, a reformed PA would control the territory in full. An interim security force made up of Arab states would take responsibility for policing the area and ensuring Hamas doesn't regenerate.
Israel and the Arab states, however, haven't fully bought into this plan. Netanyahu, for one, sees the PA as no better than Hamas and has repeatedly emphasized in public that he won't tolerate its return to Gaza. The U.S. would prefer the Arab states take the lead in postwar Gaza, yet the Gulf states with deep pockets — the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Qatar — are unwilling to carry the load unless at least a concrete pathway to an independent Palestinian state is established. This, too, is a no-go for Netanyahu, whose entire political career has been prefaced on obstructing such a state.
And then there's Hamas, which will still be around regardless of when the war ends. It has an incentive to spoil whatever plans Washington, Jerusalem and the Arab states come up with — assuming they can come up with anything.
The next few days and weeks will be the most joyful Israelis and Palestinians have felt in a very long time. But we shouldn't be under any misconceptions. This process is only just beginning and is certain to be full of complications. Whether it succeeds is still very much to be determined.
Previously:• 01/21/25 Are Trump's peace dreams for Ukraine mission impossible?
• 12/31/24 How will Syria evolve under new leadership?
• 11/14/24 How will Trump handle the war in Ukraine?
• 11/04/24 Is there really an 'axis of evil' set on destroying the US?
• 11/30/23 What will happen after the Israel-Hamas truce expires?
• 11/09/23 Pessimism is growing in Ukraine. Has the war with Russia reached a stalemate?
• 10/26/23 Biden's geopolitical equivalent of a high-wire act --- and success is by no means assured
• 10/12/23 How will the Israel-Hamas conflict affect US policy?
• 10/05/23 As the war in Ukraine grinds on, Europe will prove more crucial
• 09/18/23 The US and Vietnam should boost their relationship. China looms large
• 08/24/23 Zelensky's shiny, new toys and yet --- racking-up losses
• 08/17/23 The US is negotiating with Iran to release prisoners. Here's why that matters
• 08/03/23 What should the US do to normalize ties between Israel and Saudi Arabia?
• 06/09/23 Do we face nuclear confrontation? The erosion of agreements has heightened the risk
• 06/01/23 Why is the Defense Department immune from budget cuts?
• 05/18/23 Policy is at a crossroads in a deeply troubled Afghanistan
• 05/12/23 The US war on terror continues. We just don't talk about it
• 05/05/23 The US and world were naive about Sudan leaders' commitment to democracy
• 03/20/23 China gets the credit for improving Iran-Saudi Arabia ties --- but the US benefits
• 02/23/23 The first year of war in Ukraine has defied predictions
• 02/07/23 How does the US-China relationship continue after the spy balloon saga?
• 12/29/22 Why does the US defense budget continue to grow? America's approach needs rethinking
• 12/22/22 Ever so slowly, the nations are realigning
• 12/22/22 China is pushing a pacifist Japan into building up its military capabilities
• 12/09/22 Mideast country is putting US in a tough spot by threatening another Syria incursion
• 10/13/22 Don't underestimate the durability of autocracies
• 09/22/22 Is there still hope for a new Iran nuclear deal?
(COMMENT, BELOW)
Daniel DePetris
Chicago Tribune/(TNS)
Daniel R. DePetris is a fellow at Defense Priorities, a foreign policy think tank based in Washington, D.C., and a syndicated foreign affairs columnist for the Chicago Tribune.