What Biden should make of Erdogan's bluster

"When the time comes, we will do what is necessary. As we say, all of a sudden, we can come overnight."

"Like I always say, we'll come down on them suddenly one night."

Bellicose rhetoric has long been Recep Tayyip Erdogan's stock in trade, but Turkey's leader has recently been on a tear, targeting taunts and threats at enemies near and far, real and imagined. The near-identical admonishments above are directed, respectively, at Greece and the Kurdish People's Protection Units, or YPG, in Syria.

What both targets have in common, aside from Erdogan's wrath, is America's friendship. They serve crucial current American military goals: the containment of Russia and of the Islamic State terrorist organization.

Greece, a member of NATO, is a conduit for U.S. arms shipments into Eastern Europe - the more important now in the context of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The YPG was instrumental in driving the IS back into its Syrian hideouts after the terrorist group's dramatic 2014-15 expansion into Iraq; it remains vital to keeping the jihadists confined to their lairs.

Erdogan regards Greece with suspicion and the YPG with hostility. Greco-Turkish animosity runs deep. Turkey and Greece fought a proxy war in Cyprus in the late 1960s and early 1970s; more recently, they have clashed over hydrocarbons in the Eastern Mediterranean and over military based in Greek islands in the Aegean Sea near the Turkish coast.

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As for the YPG, Ankara regards it as an offshoot of the separatist Kurdish group in Turkey known as the PKK, designated a terrorist organization by the U.S.. Erdogan has argued that Washington was wrong to align itself with the Kurds, and has railed against the continued American protection - in the form of a small contingent of U.S. troops in Syria - afforded to the YPG.

So how worried should the Biden administration be about Erdogan's threats to "come down suddenly" on two vital allies? Turkish domestic politics complicate the answer to that question. Eight months out from a general election and his bid to extend his rule into a third decade, Erdogan is in full campaign mode.

The president's pronouncements have tended to get more provocative at the approach of polls, and he is more pugnacious than usual this time round. That's because he has little else to offer voters: Turkey's economy is tanking, with inflation and unemployment rising and the trade deficit soaring.

The impact on Erdogan's political fortunes is plain to see in polling that shows his ruling coalition trailing an opposition grouping of six parties. Although the opposition bloc is yet to name their presidential candidate, Erdogan's personal numbers are close to historic lows.

Like populists everywhere - and remember, he's the granddaddy of today's populists - Erdogan is invoking nationalism to banish the economic blues and boost his reelection prospects. This involves stoking the fear of the foreign hand interfering in Turkey's affairs. And the most convenient foreign threats are Greece and the YPG.

(Others in his retinue direct their rhetorical fire more broadly. Interior Minister Suleyman Soylu has been accusing the U.S. and the West of conspiring against Turkey, and has promised to make them "eat our dust.")

But that doesn't mean the Biden administration can turn a deaf ear to Erdogan's bluster. If his electoral prospects don't improve in the next few months, he may feel obliged to carry out one of his threats.

A military adventure in the Aegean is the more unlikely of the two. Erdogan has played fast and loose with his NATO commitments - witness his purchase of Russian missile-defense systems in defiance of the collective - but a kinetic encounter with a fellow member would represent a recklessness he has never showed in the realm of foreign policy. (He has done so in economic policy, however: Much of Turkey's problems stem directly from his kooky ideas about interest rates.)

Erdogan's most dramatic departures in foreign policy have involved breaking with Israel in 2010 and with Syrian dictator Bashar Assad the following year. Although he incurred Western displeasure in both instances, neither was likely to trigger a harsh response from the U.S. and Europe.

There was no military conflict with Israel. The Turkish incursion into Syria, justified in part as a preventative measure against the PKK's terrorist designs, certainly complicated American plans, but some in Washington were not displeased to see Turkish boots on ground that Russia had entered and the U.S. was hoping to exit.

Greece is another matter, however. The last time Erdogan rattled a sabre in the direction of Athens was in 2020, when Turkish and Greek naval vessels squared off in the Eastern Med. After then-German Chancellor Angela Merkel talked the two parties down from the ledge, French President Emmanuel Macron threatened European Union sanctions against Turkey.

An actual exchange of fire in the Aegean would carry greater consequences, inflicting serious sanctions pain on an economy already in agony.

That leaves the YPG. Military action against the Kurdish group, again on the pretext of warding off terrorists, would risk Turkish casualties, but it is unlikely to invite much more than finger-wagging from Washington. Having abandoned American allies in Afghanistan, President Biden is unlikely to be greatly exercised over the fate of the Kurds.

Even so, Erdogan is unlikely to do anything "suddenly, one night." The whole point of political theater is to play it out for maximum gain and in full sight of the intended audience - in this instance, the Turkish electorate. If he decided to move against the YPG, expect Erdogan to take his time in stoking up nationalist passions and preparing his countrymen for any casualties.

When that happens, the Biden administration will have some time to plead on behalf of the Kurds. But that, too, will probably be mostly performative.

(COMMENT, BELOW)

Bobby Ghosh is an Indian-born American journalist and commentator. He is a columnist and member of the editorial board at Bloomberg Opinion, writing on foreign affairs, with a special focus on the Middle East and the wider Islamic world. Starting in 2016, Ghosh was editor-in-chief of the Hindustan Times and TIME Magazine's World Editor.

Previously:
• 10/07/22: Iran's ruler faces a formidable new foe --- schoolgirls
• 08/15/22: Bolton plot should be a warning on Iran nuclear talks
• 07/06/22: Erdogan missed a big opportunity with NATO
• 06/13/22: Iran has overplayed its hand in nuclear talks
• 05/25/22: 'Slow Joe' is missing an opportunity to put pressure on Iran
• 05/12/22: Erdogan's outreach to neighbors has one problem: Erdogan
• 05/05/22: The U.S. risks paying a high price for a nuclear deal with Iran
• 04/21/22: Yemen truce is good news for the wider world
• 03/23/22: The world's deadliest war isn't in Ukraine, but in Ethiopia
• 03/11/22: The Dems just doesn't understand Iran's regime
• 03/11/22: In the nuclear face-off with Iran, Biden just blinked
• 01/20/22: So, Trump is responsible for Iran's aggressive behavior?
• 01/18/22: THE SECRET'S OUT: Iran's economic resilience is mostly a mirage
• 01/07/22: Biden must hold Ethiopia's Abiy accountable
• 12/29/21: Fraying Saudi-UAE ties put U.S. objectives at risk
• 11/30/21: Iran demonstrates it isn't serious about nuclear talks
• 11/03/21: To negotiate with the Taliban, bring women to the table
• 10/11/21: Iraq's leader is betting on a hung parliament to retain power
• 09/27/21: A coup fails in Sudan but its fragile democracy remains at risk
• 09/13/21: The Taliban caretakers will keep the neighbors up
• 08/30/21: Trusting the Taliban to fight Islamic State
• 08/23/21: What will the Taliban do with a $22 billion economy?
• 07/28/21: The first and now the last best hope of the Arab Spring is at risk
• 07/15/21: No joy for Iran over the Taliban romp next door
• 07/07/21: Why Macron and Erdogan are suddenly playing nice
• 06/17/21: Iran's election is all about Supreme Leader's toxic legacy
• 08/17/20: Macron's muscle-flexing will make Mediterranean tensions worse
• 08/06/20: Beirut explosions create a dilemma for the world
• 06/25/20: Egypt's el-Sissi suffers a stunning reversal of fortunes
• 05/05/20: The Saudis' defacto leader is stuck exactly where Trump wants him
• 04/20/20: Trump is right to block IMF aid for Iran
• 02/17/20: Algeria wants a role in Libya that it can't afford
• 02/06/20: Iraq's new prime minister may not last long
• 01/27/20: Libya deal is a gentleman's bargain between rogues
• 01/20/20: Europe's lack of resolve is revealing --- to Iran
• 01/14/20: Iran isn't facing a 'Chernobyl moment'