|
Jewish World Review Nov. 22, 2000 / 24 Mar-Cheshvan 5761
David Frum
The Constitution is not a perfect document. But the Electoral College is not one of its mistakes. The United States is hardly alone, after all, in accepting the risk that a chief executive might win fewer votes than his defeated opponent. Such outcomes occur all the time in the English-speaking parliamentary democracies: in Britain, as recently as 1974, when Conservative Party leader Edward Heath outpolled Labour's Jim Callaghan, but Callaghan won more seats in the House of Commons. If anything, the rule is that the chief executive is most likely to be elected by direct, universal, popular vote precisely where democracy is weakest: in Mexico, in Russia, in Nigeria. In some ways, it's strange that so much attention should be focused on the allegedly anti-democratic effects of the Electoral College. The U.S. Constitution is studded with anti-majoritarian features. It's easily possible, for instance, to win a majority of the seats in the House of Representatives with a minority of the votes cast in all House races nationwide. In the Senate, members representing only a small fraction of the population of the United States can defeat or delay bills demanded by large majorities. And in the most extreme case, five justices of the U.S. Supreme Court can thwart the wishes of hundreds of millions of their fellow-citizens. Compared to all these other offenses against the principle of majority rule, the Electoral College seems like awfully small beer -- especially since it comes with some important compensating advantages. Many of those are well known, but two in particular don't get mentioned enough. First, the College promotes national unity by requiring candidates for the presidency to assemble very broad coalitions. French presidential elections for instance have a bad way of turning into tugs of war between those on the upward side and the downward side of the median income. The electoral college complicates such potentially destabilizing struggles between have-mores and have-lesses by forcing each side also to consider regional and state-by-state concerns: the interests of farmers and fishermen, the values of the towns and countryside, as well as those of the big cities and suburbs. Second, the Electoral College strengthens the president in his dealings with the Senate. The Senate is in many ways the most crucial house of Congress for a president: It confirms his Cabinet and holds over him the ultimate power of removal from office. A president opposed by the Senate can barely even function. The Electoral College ensures that the president is elected in a way at least partly analogous with the way that the Senate is elected, thus increasing the odds that the president and the Senate majority will belong to the same party. In a big national election, a president might be tempted to dismiss the concerns of places like North Dakota and Delaware. But the four senators of those two tiny states can tangle up his judicial nominations forever. This was a very nerve-wracking election. It's wrong to assume that it would have been less nerve-wracking without the Electoral College. Al Gore's popular-vote margin over George Bush amounts to about 0.1 percent of the votes cast. Had there been no Electoral College, his presidency would have been as hampered by that poor showing as George Bush would be by winning the Electoral College without the popular vote.
So if the next administration is weak, don't blame an 18th century voting system; blame the
profound divisions in the country that split the vote for president almost exactly in
11/15/00: From now 'til Jan. 20
|