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Jewish World Review March 18, 2002 / 5 Nisan 5762
Philip Terzian
Reading about Andrea Yates, or pondering her vacant expression in the
courtroom, it is not difficult to conclude that she is clearly mentally ill.
There is no evidence that Mrs. Yates is malingering: She has a documented
history of psychosis, which was only partly relieved by robust medication.
Most people would assume that a woman who methodically drowns her five young
children must be abnormal. And we can agree that the conduct of the insane,
like the profoundly retarded, should not be judged by quite the same
standards we apply to everyone else.
But since Andrea Yates did not follow the logic of her illness, and kill
herself along with her children, we are left with the challenge of solving a
difficult problem. What is to be done with an obvious lunatic who kills five
innocent victims?
As it happens, the law is alternately clear and unsatisfactory on the
question. In 1843 a man named Daniel M'naghten killed a British civil
servant in the course of trying to assassinate the prime minister, Sir
Robert Peel. M'naghten, who was both violent and delusional, was judged not
guilty by reason of insanity. But there was such an uproar over the verdict
that a standard was established -- since called the M'Naghten rule, and
adopted in America -- which asked a basic question: Did the defendant
understand, at the time he committed the crime, that his conduct was wrong?
In the mid-20th century the M'naghten rule was modified in Britain and
America to this extent: Even if the defendant knew the difference between
right and wrong, he might still be so diminished as to be incapable of
"conforming his conduct" to the letter of the law. It was on this basis that
John Hinckley, who shot Ronald Reagan to impress Jodie Foster, was acquitted
on the grounds of mental illness. Once again public reaction to a perceived
miscarriage of justice led to a change in the law: Texas, among other
states, reverted to something close to the old M'naghten rule, asking only
whether the defendant understood his conduct was wrong.
That, presumably, is why the jury in Houston found Andrea Yates guilty
of capital murder. Not only did Mrs. Yates understand the nature of her
conduct, she called the police after killing her children, and freely
confessed what she had done. It is here that the law and science collide.
For while Mrs. Yates's "guilt" is self-evident, we are left with the
sensation that a strict application of the law is not quite justice.
A psychiatrist would argue that Andrea Yates is insane by any reasonable
definition, and that her conduct was informed by her illness, not deliberate
choice. The fact that Mrs. Yates appears outwardly normal -- not screaming
or chewing the carpet -- only adds a discordant note. Mrs. Yates seems to
have believed that her children were threatened by Satan, and better off
dead than vulnerable to phantom menaces. Mrs. Yates may have understood that
drowning her children was illegal -- that is why she called the cops after
laying their bodies out on her bed -- but she was also convinced that
killing them was the right thing to do. It's a train of thought only a sick
mind could follow.
The problem, of course, is that we are left with the stark, horrific
spectacle of a woman holding her five young children underwater until they
drown. Our intellectual understanding of Andrea Yates is tempered by an
emotional reaction to her crime. Added to this confusion is the public
anointment of Andrea Yates as a prominent victim of post-partum depression,
and the curious rationale that her plainly oblivious husband is equally
responsible for his wife's unspeakable act.
The sad truth is that we expect the law and medicine to define and
resolve these problems, but neither can satisfactorily settle such
troublesome issues. Human institutions are, after all, only human. Medicine
will help us appreciate the nature of Andrea Yates's illness, and put her
behavior in scientific perspective. The law is direct in its judgment of
action, and provides a basic framework for deciding what comes next: Life
imprisonment, in this instance. But neither the judicial system nor the
profession of psychiatry can prevent children from being killed by their
mothers, predict and direct the course of human conduct, or furnish
infallible judgments.
If there is a device, formula, doctrine or rule that administers justice
fairly between Andrea Yates and her five dead children, it has not yet been
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