Jewish World Review March 21, 2001 / 26 Adar, 5761
Frank J. Gaffney, Jr.
Critical mass
http://www.jewishworldreview.com --
WHILE the Bush Administration's pending decisions about missile
defense and the size and costs of its effort to rebuild the U.S. military
have been the focus of considerable attention and debate, a no-less-epochal
review is underway -- one that has, to date, received little public
consideration.
In the course of last year's campaign, Candidate George W. Bush
expressed a willingness to consider radically and unilaterally reducing the
quantity and the alert status of America's nuclear forces -- contributing to
a new post-Cold War posture featuring an increasing reliance on anti-missile
capabilities. As President, Mr. Bush has asked his Administration to assess
the wisdom and desirability of such initiatives.
If this study is done in a dispassionate and rigorous way, these are
the sorts of responses he will shortly be receiving:
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Extreme care should be exercised over further, deep reductions in
U.S. nuclear weapons. The object of retaining a nuclear arsenal is, after
all, not primarily to have sufficient means to fight an incalculably
destructive war. Rather, it is to prevent one from happening. The greatest
danger of all would be if the United States were to be seen to have so
diminished its deterrent capabilities as to make the world "safe" for
nuclear war.
Deterrence is not a science but an art. There is no objectively
right or wrong answer as to the number of nuclear arms the United States
"needs" to have; it is a question of risk. Contrary to the hoary theories
of arms control, however, the risks appear greater when U.S. deterrent power
is discounted than when it is overwhelming. It is, in short, infinitely
better to err on the side of having too much nuclear capability than to have
catalyzed, however unintentionally, circumstances in which nuclear weapons
might wind up being used by having unduly diminished the credibility of
one's deterrent.
This is especially true in an international environment that is as
unpredictable as the present one. We cannot say for certain Russia's future
course, but it seems unlikely that the former Soviet Union will become more
benign in the years immediately ahead. For the moment, it is unable to
afford large nuclear forces and would like us to agree to mirror-image the
deep reductions economic considerations compel them to make. This would be
a mistake; if the Kremlin reverts to form and marshalls the resources to
rebuild its offensive weaponry, negotiated limits will -- as usual -- wind
up binding us, but not them.
For its part, China is determined to acquire great power status and
the nuclear arms that it believes are appropriate to such a state. What is
more, virtually every one of Russia and China's allies -- what we call
"rogue states" they call "clients" -- are bent on acquiring atomic, if not
thermonuclear, capabilities and are receiving help toward that end from
Moscow and/or Beijing.
While the deployment of effective American missile defenses can --
and should -- mitigate somewhat the dangers that such trends represent, it
is unnecessary and would be unwise to make further "deep" reductions below
the roughly 3500 U.S. nuclear warheads America planned to retain under the
START II Treaty until such time as the beneficial effects of such
anti-missile deployments are demonstrated in the diminution of proliferation
and related threats to this country, her allies and interests.
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The folly of unduly cutting the United States' nuclear deterrent
would be greatly exacerbated were the Nation deliberately to reduce the
readiness of whatever strategic forces it decides to retain. Proponents of
"de-alerting" America's strategic missiles claim this is an appropriate and
necessary response to the danger that Russian weapons might be launched
accidentally or without proper authorization.
This sort of thinking is reckless in the extreme. Effectively
eliminating the United States's capability to respond with nuclear arms in a
credible and prompt manner is unlikely to eliminate the problem of the
Kremlin's "loose nukes"; they are the result of systemic forces (for
example, a decentralized command and control system, deteriorating
conditions and morale in the Russian military, corruption, etc.), not
inadequate technology.
To its credit, the Bush Administration appears to be reconsidering
the enormously expensive programs its predecessor established in the name of
"securing" the Kremlin's nuclear wherewithal. Rose Gottemoeller, the highly
controversial Energy Department appointee who sought to fund these programs
to the tune of $1.2 billion in Fiscal Year 2002, has called the Bush team's
reported plan to pare them back to "only" $800 million "a shame." What is,
in fact, truly shameful has been the lack of accountability for these
initiatives that has, according to successive critical reports by the
General Accounting Office, enabled the funds to be used for, among other
things, subsidizing the ongoing Russian nuclear modernization program.
While the Bush Administration is at it, it should call to a halt one
of Ms. Gottemoeller's other undesirable legacies: a multi-million dollar
contract now up for renewal with the National Academy of Science's
notoriously left-wing Committee on International Security and Arms Control
(CISAC) for a study of how to reduce U.S. nuclear forces to just 200
warheads -- a number comparable to levels Communist China hopes shortly to
achieve. Since this is an outcome that would be wholly incompatible with
the maintenance of a credible U.S. deterrent to say nothing of common sense,
the taxpayer's money should not be wasted on its further evaluation.
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Finally, the Bush nuclear review must address not only the need for
a credible nuclear deterrent today; it must also ensure the safety,
reliability and effectiveness of America's deterrent for the foreseeable
future. This will require several politically difficult but vital steps --
including, a resumption of limited, underground nuclear testing required
both to continue to certify the existing stockpile and to design, develop
and field the next generation of nuclear weapons upon which the Nation will
depend in the decades to come. The latter could include deep penetrating
warheads capable of holding at risk the underground command posts that even
rogue state regimes are acquiring today and an anti-missile warhead in case
hit-to-kill missile defense technologies prove unworkable.
If President Bush receives and heeds such advice from his
subordinates' nuclear review, chances are that his legacy will be one of
leaving the U.S. military not only better capable of fighting the Nation's
next war, but of preventing it from
happening.
JWR contributor Frank J. Gaffney, Jr. heads the Center for Security Policy. Send your comments to him by clicking here.
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01/30/01: The missile defense decision
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01/09/01: Wake-up call on space
01/02/01: Secretary Rumsfeld
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12/19/00: Deploy missile defense now
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12/05/00: Preempting Bush
11/28/00: What Clinton hath wrought
11/21/00: HE'S BAAAACK
11/14/00: The world won't wait
© 2000, Frank J. Gaffney, Jr.
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