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The Biden administration's failed humanitarian mission in Gaza was more dangerous and costly than the Pentagon has publicly acknowledged, causing dozens of injuries to U.S. personnel and resulting in tens of millions dollars in equipment damage, according to a newly released watchdog report.
The 2024 mission to construct an offshore pier and floating causeway for aid delivery was launched after the White House and U.S. diplomats failed to persuade the Israelis to open overland crossings for trucks to deliver humanitarian assistance to Gaza's beleaguered population. The resulting effort, led by Army and Navy forces to stand up the pier, was stricken with challenges from the start, including rough seas that tore the structure apart, ships that ran aground and the death of a U.S. soldier.
During the mission, 62 personnel were injured, the Defense Department Inspector General said in its report, far more than previously disclosed. Army Sgt. Quandarius Stanley was critically injured in May 2024 in an accident involving a forklift aboard a Navy ship; he died five months later at a Veterans Affairs hospital.
Investigators could not determine which of the 62 injuries occurred while performing duties or resulted from off duty activities or other medical conditions. It was not clear whether any of the injured included Defense Department civilians. There was confusion throughout the U.S. military on responsibility to answer basic questions about the pier mission. Officials at Central Command, the Pentagon and the Army referred questions to each other.
The report underlines the questionable value of a mission that cost an estimated $230 million but failed to accomplish the goals outlined by the Biden administration and Pentagon officials. The pier mission ran for three months, but it was functional for only about 20 days. Central Command, which oversees operations in the Middle East, said its off-loading of 20 million pounds of food and supplies was a historic success, though it was a fraction of what aid groups said was needed to stave off famine in Gaza.
The humanitarian need in Gaza at the time was dire, with almost 2 million Palestinians facing extreme hunger, according to the United Nations. To blunt a potential famine, civilians there required about 500 truckloads of assistance per day. That was roughly how much the U.S. unloaded during the entire pier mission, Reuters reported.
President Joe Biden approved the plan despite warnings from within the U.S. government that rough waves could pose significant challenges, and objections from officials who feared the operation would detract from a diplomatic push to compel Israel to open additional land routes into the war zone, a separate investigation from USAID's inspector general found last year.
More than two dozen watercraft and other equipment were damaged, causing about $31 million in repair and maintenance costs, the inspector general report found, citing numerous failings. The Army and Navy did not meet standards for equipment and unit readiness, the report said, "nor did they organize, train, and equip their forces to meet common joint standards." Transportation Command, which oversees coordination of military assets, also fell short of standards in planning and exercises, the report found.
"As a result, the DoD faces potential challenges meeting JLOTS requirements in fast-paced, contested, or simultaneous regional or global operations," the report concluded, using the acronym for the military's Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore system.
Crucially, Army and Navy equipment - including watercraft, piers, causeways and communication systems - were not designed to work together, which led to damage in the Gaza operation. Planners also did not think through mission-specific needs, such as beach conditions and sea states, that should have informed how commanders executed the operation.
The U.S. military deprioritized JLOTS capabilities and training in the past decade to invest in other systems, presaging the botched mission. The Navy decommissioned a causeway system that uses a more weather-resistant pier, the report found, and the Army sold almost half its boats in 2018 and 2019, reducing its ability to carry out the mission.
Aid groups blasted the Israeli and U.S. governments at the time for failing to open overland crossings to allow aid to flow in greater numbers, describing the Biden administration's decision to move forward with the pier system as humanitarian theater that served little use beyond political messaging to his Democratic base.