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Jan. 7, 2009

Jonah Goldberg: Who are the real Nazis?

Anne Applebaum: Pointless Peace Proposals

Jan. 6, 2009

Caroline B. Glick: Iran's Gazan diversion?

Dennis Prager: Dissecting Dershowitz

Jan. 5, 2009

Mark Steyn: Gaza has its version of rocket scientists

Mona Charen: The So-called International Community

Jan. 2, 2009

Rabbi Abraham J. Twerski: Having a holy tongue

Caroline B. Glick : Hamas' march to victory

Dec. 31, 2008

Dore Gold: Is Israel Using 'Disproportionate Force'?

Renee Enna:: Succulent 'stewp' is quick, easy fix

Dec. 30, 2008

Jonathan Mark: Israel's Response Is Disproportionate

Wesley Pruden: It's time once more to blame the Jews

Dec. 29, 2008

Rabbi Hillel Goldberg: Chanukah: 'Give me Judaism or give me death'

Michael B. Oren: A crisis and an opportunity

Dec. 26, 2008

Rabbi Yonason Goldson: When the past meets the future

Caroline B. Glick: Iran and Hamas do Christmas

Dec. 24, 2008

Rabbi Dovid Zauderer: Judaism's Santa problem

The Kosher Gourmet by Ethel G. Hofman CHANUKAH FORK-FINGER FOOD FEAST

Dec. 23, 2008

Caroline B. Glick: Repeating failure in Gaza

Dec. 22, 2008

Rabbi Boruch Leff: Too many Jews today are missing the intended purpose of one of Judaism's most beloved holidays

Barry Rubin: Liar, liar, pants on cease-fire

Dec. 19, 2008

Rabbi Yonason Goldson: The Final Battlefield

Caroline B. Glick: Betting on a dead horse

Dec. 18, 2008

The Kosher Gourmet by Steve Petusevsky: Juicy Chef's hella top, hella bottom, hallelujah in the middle

Craig Crossman : More gifts for geeks --- and those who love them

Dec. 17, 2008

Dion Nissenbaum: Israel kicks out outrageously biased UN official

Craig Crossman : Gifts for geeks --- and those who love them

Dec. 16, 2008

Jonathan Rosenblum: The Gift of Joy

Frank J. Gaffney, Jr.: Uncle Shariah

Dec. 15, 2008

The Jewish Ethicist by Rabbi Dr. Asher Meir : Expert witnesses who put themselves first

Barry Rubin: What they say isn't what you hear

Dec. 12, 2008

Rabbi Hillel Goldberg: Can the Bible be a secular language?

Caroline B. Glick: What a PM Netanyahu faces from Washington

Dec. 11, 2008

Rabbi Leiby Burnham: Our role in the Divine's global corporation, World Inc.

The Kosher Gourmet by Steve Petusevsky: A retro-tasting pareve pot pie made with a light hand

Dec. 10, 2008

Rabbi Paysach J. Krohn: Groom admits he was caught "red handed"

Kara McGuire: No money for gifts? No problem

Dec. 9, 2008

The Jewish Ethicist by Rabbi Dr. Asher Meir : Can I make my boss treat me fairly?

Stratfor Geopolitical Intelligence Report: Next Steps in the Indo-Pakistani Crisis

Dec. 8, 2008

Rabbi Avi Shafran: 'Chanukah Bush' flap and graciousness

Mark Steyn: Jews get killed, but Muslims feel vulnerable

Dec. 5, 2008

Rabbi A. Henach Leibowitz: Truth --- The Key to Gratitude

Jeff Jacoby: UN's obsession is grotesque and Orwellian

Oct. 29, 2003
Mortimer B. Zuckerman: Graffiti On History's Walls (MUST-READ!)

Jewish World Review Jan. 17, 2005 / 7 Shevat, 5765

Prez needs to adapt Nixon's Vietnamization program to Iraq

By Jack Kelly


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http://www.JewishWorldReview.com | The people who predicted that Afghanistan and the assault on Baghdad would be a "quagmires" are now telling you the insurgency in Iraq is growing.

This journalistic meme mushroomed after the head of Iraq's intelligence service estimated the resistance was comprised of 40,000 fighters and 400,000 supporters.

The first thing to note is that this is about 8 percent of Iraq's roughly five million Sunnis, less than 2 percent of its 25 million people.

The second thing to note, as did Jim Dunnigan of StrategyPage.com, is the estimate matches almost precisely prewar estimates of the number of Saddam's security forces, Baath Party activists, and their families.

The Baath party was hated by ordinary Iraqis before the war, and is less popular now. Baathists intimidate, but lack the appeal to proselytize. Their ranks are not increasing.

Jihadis are a small proportion of the resistance forces (most intelligence estimates put them at less than 10 percent), and the "help" they are providing is hurting the Baathists, because they are perceived as foreign invaders, thinks Brian Dunn, a former Michigan Army National Guardsman who writes frequently for military publications. (Osama bin Laden, a Saudi. has declared Abu Musab al Zarqawi, a Jordanian, an "emir" of Iraq.)

"The Baathists screwed up big by allying with the Islamists," Dunn said in "Dignified Rant," his web log. "They thought they could use the Islamists to spark a national revolt against American forces, but instead the Islamists are giving all Iraqis a foreign enemy to rally against."

It is less the prospect of success than the consequences of failure that motivates the resistance, Dunnigan said.

"The Kurds and Shia Arabs are 80 percent of the population, they control the oil and have American troops to back up their efforts," he said. "The Kurds and Shia Arabs have lists of names, because Saddam's thugs didn't wear masks when they ran things for three decades. Guess who is going to lose? But that thought is what is driving the resistance. The Baath Party thugs know what they will have to face eventually, if they don't regain control of Iraq."

The elections are critical because "as sovereignty passes more and more to the Iraqis in concrete terms, it will be easier for the non-Baathist Sunni to join other Iraqis to kill and expel the foreign invaders — the Islamists — and subdue the Baathists who aid the foreign invaders," Dunn said. Though defeat of the resistance is inevitable unless the U.S. precipitously withdraws, victory isn't likely to come soon. History suggests that the average time required to defeat an insurgency is nine years. The Baathists have plenty of money and a safe haven (so far) in Syria.

The mission of retired Gen. Gary Luck to Iraq suggests a change in role for and a significant draw down of U.S. forces before the end of the year. By late summer Iraqi security forces — stiffened by the presence of American advisers and backed by U.S. air power — can assume full responsibility for crushing the resistance.

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U.S. troops will be required for four or five years more to protect Iraq from hostile neighbors. But this would be a much smaller number of troops, deployed (mostly) along the Syrian and Iranian borders.

Luck — who commanded the XVIII Airborne Corps in the first Gulf War, and was an adviser to Gen. Franks in Operation Iraqi Freedom — was one of the Army's premier special operators. Special Forces types have been arguing for months that victory is more likely to be achieved by a smaller number of specialized troops rather than by a larger number of conventional troops.

Counter insurgency war is driven by intelligence, and quick raids by experienced commandos. Large numbers of conventional troops mostly provide targets for the resisters, and their presence over time becomes an irritant for Iraqis who welcomed liberation.

A model for success is President Nixon's Vietnamization program. In 1968, there were 550,000 U.S. troops in Vietnam, and we were suffering more casualties each month than we have during the entire Iraq war. Four years later, U.S. troop levels had declined to 69,000, the Viet Cong were crushed, and the North Vietnamese sued for peace.

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JWR contributor Jack Kelly, a former Marine and Green Beret, was a deputy assistant secretary of the Air Force in the Reagan administration. Comment by clicking here.

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© 2005, Jack Kelly